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  A classic issue in agricultural economics is the design of schemes that would offer 
insurance against production risks in agriculture.  The experience with conventional crop 
insurance has been disappointing as insurers have struggled to obtain reliable actuarial 
data on individual yields (Skees, Black and Barnett). The primary attraction of area yield 
insurance schemes is that insurers do not have to contend with the informational 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Halcrow).  These problems can be 
dismissed because indemnities and premiums are based not on a producer’s individual 
yield but rather on the aggregate yield of a sorrounding geographical area.  However, 
how good are they in reducing the risks faced by producers?  What are the structural 
features of yield risk that determine this effectiveness and are these features important in 
design?   
The answers provided by the literature build on a reduced form linear relationship 
between individual yield and area yield.  The key parameter of the reduced form model is 
the beta which is the slope coefficient of the linear model.  For an exogenously specified 
insurance contract, Miranda showed the extent of variance reduction for a producer to be 
proportional to that producer’s beta.  Consequently, for producers with large enough 
betas, the risk-reduction from area yield insurance plans may well outweigh the risk 
reduction from individual yield plans with large deductibles.  Mahul showed that if 
insurance is actuarially fair, then a producer’s optimal indemnity schedule contains no 
deductible and has slope equal to beta.  However, the literature does not discuss, except 
as informal remarks, how the betas are determined.  Why do some producers have higher   2
betas than others?  How would it depend on individual production functions?  And would 
the level of aggregation matter?   
To answer such questions, this paper provides the structure for the reduced form 
linear model.  The structural model is a set of assumptions about individual yield 
functions.  Area yields are obtained as an aggregate of individual yields.  Under some 
conditions, individual yields can be expressed as a linear function of area yield.  The 
paper characterizes the entire class of structural models that are consistent with the 
reduced form model.  The characterization is valuable for several reasons.  First, for any 
member of the general class of structural models consistent with the reduced form, the 
betas can be readily computed as a function of structural parameters, which can be 
producer and region specific.  This provides insights into the relation between stochastic 
technologies and producer betas.  Second, and as shall be shown, the structural model is 
useful for analyzing the relation between the level of aggregation (that determines area 
yields) and the risk reduction due to area yield crop insurance.  Third, the characterization 
points to structural models that are not consistent with reduced form models.  Previous 
results do not apply to these models.  In this paper, we consider optimal area yield 
insurance for an important class of structural models that do not imply, and nor are 
implied by, the reduced form model.   
 
Literature 
  Both Miranda and Mahul begin by assuming that the expectation of individual 
yield conditional on area yield is linear in area yield.  Thus, we have  
(1)        i i i i y y e m b m + - + = ) (    3
where yi is producer i’s yield, m i is the unconditional mean of yi, i.e., E(yi), y is area yield, 
bi is the slope parameter satisfying 2 / ) , ( y i i y y Cov s b = ,  m is the unconditional mean of y 
and ei is a mean zero random variable uncorrelated with area yield.  Equation (1) 
decomposes individual yield variation into a systemic component  ) ( m b - y i perfectly 
correlated with area yield (since  ) 1 ) ( / ) ), ( ( 2 2 2 = - y Var y y Cov i i b m b and a non-
systemic component i e uncorrelated with area yield.  For reasons that will become clear 
later, we shall refer to (1) as a reduced form model.   
Suppose the indemnity schedule is  ) 0 , max( ) ( y y y I c - = where yc is a yield 
trigger fixed exogenously. Then Miranda showed  
(a) The extent of variance reduction is proportional to bi and other exogenous parameters 
that are the same across all farmers. 
(b) It thus follows that more highly correlated a producer’s yield is to the area yield, 
greater is the risk reduction.   
Mahul considered the choice of an optimal contract  ) (y I .  If insurance is actuarially 
fair, then the optimal contract is characterized by  ) ( ) ( y y y I m i - =b where ym, the yield 
trigger, is the maximum possible value of y.
1  Hence the slope of the optimal indemnity 
schedule is -bi.  An aspect of this result, not noted by Mahul but relevant for us, is that 
the optimal indemnity schedule is independent of the non-systemic risk and its moments 
(such as Var(ei)).    
 
                                                 
1 For the reduced form relation (1), Vercammen considers the optimal design of an area yield crop 
insurance contract when the yield trigger is constrained, for institutional reasons, to be below the maximum 
possible value of area yield.     4
Another implication is that optimal area yield insurance completely eliminates the 
systemic risk.  To see this, note that a producer’s revenue with insurance (denoted p) is  
(2)        P y I yi - + = ) ( p  
where P is the premium.  When a producer chooses the optimal area yield insurance, (2) 
becomes  
(3)        P y y y m i i i i - - + + - + = ) ( ) ( b e m b m p  
where we have used (1).  But when insurance is actuarially fair,  ) ( m b - = m i y P .  
Substituting in (3), we see that the producer bears only the non-systemic risk, i.e.,   
      i i e m p + =  
Thus optimal area yield insurance fully insures against the systemic risk.  Since the 
optimal insurance is independent of the riskiness of the non-systemic risk ei, we have the 
result that the optimal area yield insurance delivers full insurance against the insured 
(systemic) risk whatever be the riskiness of the uninsured (non-systemic) risk.   
We note a final result regarding the dispersion of betas.  Miranda showed that the 
acreage weighted average of the betas within any area is always one.  Hence 
      1 = ￿
i
i i w b    
where wi denotes the ratio of producer i’s acreage to total acreage in the area.   
 
A Structural Model of Systemic and Non-Systemic Risks 
Consider a region R where there are n producers.  Producer i’s yield yi, is given by  
(4)        i i i y h m =    5
where m i is producer i’s mean yield and hi is a unit mean random variable capturing the 
risks of farming.  (4) is a standard specification of stochastic technologies where risks are 
multiplicative to mean yields. hi is a linear combination of two independent shocks and is 
given by  
(5)        gq a h + = i i e  
where ei is a shock specific to i and q  is a shock common to all producers in region R.  
We therefore refer to ei as the non-systemic or individual risk and q as the systemic or 
aggregate risk.  The individual and aggregate risks satisfy the following properties: 
1 ) ( = q E ,     ) ( 2
q s q = Var ,  2 ) (    , 1 ) ( e i i e Var e E s = =  , i e Cov i   all for    0 ) ( = q , and 
j i e e Cov j i „ =   all for    0 ) ( .  To ensure the composite risk hi has unit mean, we impose the 
restriction (a + g) = 1.  Individual yields are, therefore, 
(6)        ) ( i i i e y a gq m + =  
 
We also assume that individual risks are independent of mean yields, i.e.,  i e E( | m i) = 
E(ei).  This completes the description of the structural model.   
The area yield for the region R is  






i i e w w y w y ￿ ￿ ￿ + = = m a m gq  
where wi denotes the area share of the ith producer.  Let m denote the mean area yield 
(i.e., average of the mean yields of producers). Then,  ￿ =
i
i i wm m  and  
(7)      ) ( i i
i
i e w y ￿ + = m a gqm  
Now decompose  ) ( i i
i
i e w ￿ m as    6
(8)      e e e w e w
i
i i i i i
i
i m m m m + - - =￿ ￿ ) )( ( ) (  
where  ￿ =
i
i ie w e is the area average of individual risks.  Note that the first term on the 
right-hand side of (8) is the sample covariance (weighted) between mean yields and 
individual risk.   If the region contains a large number of producers, and if the law of 
large numbers applies, the sample covariance will approach (in probability) the 
population covariance (assumed to be zero).  Similarly, e in large samples will be close 
to E(ei).  
When wi = (1/n), it is straightforward to use the law of large numbers to obtain 
large sample results.  In the case of weighted averages, however, a restriction on the 
weights is necessary.  Essentially, we need to assume that the average yield is not 
dominated by the yield of any single producer.  This requirement is automatically 
satisfied by the unweighted sum but needs to be explicitly assumed in the case of 
weighted sums.
2  Assuming this condition to be satisfied, we use large sample 
approximations to get 
(9)      m m m m = + = ￿ ) ( ) , ( ) ( i i i i i
i
i e E e Cov e w  
Substituting in (7), area yield is  
(10)        m a gq ] [ + = y  
                                                 
2 Consider ￿
i
i ix a where xi is i.i.d with mean m  and  1 = ￿
i
i a . Then m = ￿ ) (
i
i ix a E .  By 
Chebychev’s inequality, given any d  > 0, Prob[ | m - ￿
i
i ix a |>d ] ￿ £
i
i i a x Var 2 2) / ) ( ( d , the limit of 
which tends to zero as long as for every n, there exists a bound c such that  c ai £ and c(n)    0 ﬁ for large 
n.     7
Thus, area yield is random only because of aggregate systemic shocks as individual risks 
cancel out in the aggregate.  Since area yield is a monotonic function of q, the inverse 
function exists and is given by  
        mg ma q / ] [ - = y  
Substituting for q in (6), we obtain producer yield as a function of area yield, i.e.,  
      i i i i e y y a m ma m m + - = ) )( / (  or  
      i i i i i i e y y a m a m m m m m + - + - = ) )( / (  or 
(11)       ) 1 ( ) )( / ( - + - + = i i i i i e y y a m m m m m  
which is identical to the reduced form model (1) if we denote  i i b m m = ) / ( and 
i i i e e a m = - ) 1 ( .  Hence we have the following result.   
 
Proposition 1:  If the structural model is described by equations (4) to (6), then it has a 
reduced form representation (1) with the following relationships between the structural 
and reduced form parameters:  
(a)  ) / ( m m b i i =  
(b)   ) 1 ( - = i i i e a m e  
 
From part (a), we see that for any individual producer the b parameter is the ratio 
of that individual’s mean yield to the mean of area yield. It follows immediately that 
1 = ￿
i
i i w b .  This result was noted earlier by Miranda.  From part (b), we see that the 
error term in the linear projection of individual yield on area yield is heteroscedastic. In   8
particular,  ) ( i Var e =  2 2 2
e i s a m which varies across producers even though the non-
systemic risk in the structural model is assumed to be homoscedastic.   
  In an empirical analysis of 102 cotton farms in Kentucky, Miranda observed that 
the distribution of the empirical betas possesses a regular, bell shape centred on 1.  
Proposition 1 says that this property is inherited from the distribution of average yields.  
Since the distribution of average yields depends on the dispersion of soil and climatic 
conditions in the region, Proposition 1 provides the formal basis for Miranda’s conjecture 
that “..the more homogenous are the soil and climatic conditions faced by producers in a 
given area, the more closely the bi ‘s will cluster around one.” (pp 236).  To this, we can 
add that the dispersion of betas will also depend on the heterogeneity in the other factors 
that determine yield such as management practices, farming skills and capital assets.  In 
the extreme when all farmers have the same mean yield, they will also have  betas 
identically equal to one.  We now turn to the implications of our results for area yield 
insurance. 
 
Proposition 2:  Suppose the area-yield indemnity schedule is ) 0 , max( ) ( y y y I c - = where 
yc is a yield trigger fixed exogenously.  Then for a given region, the extent of variance-
reduction due to area yield insurance is directly proportional to mean yields.   
Miranda showed the extent of variance reduction to be proportional to bi.  Since m 
is fixed for a given region, the result follows from Proposition 1.  The implication is that 
if producers are restricted to insurance contracts as specified above, a producer would 
like to be grouped with other producers who have lower mean yields.  Conversely,   9
producers with low mean yields relative to the average will have little interest in area 
yield insurance.  
However, if producers are allowed to choose optimal insurance plans then we 
know from Mahul’s analysis that the yield trigger will be chosen to be the maximum area 
yield and the slope of the indemnity schedule (i.e., coverage) would be -bi.  The 
following result is therefore immediate.    
 
Proposition 3:  Producers with higher mean yields will choose higher coverage in an 
optimal area yield insurance plan. 
  
A General Structural Model 
  The earlier section presented a structural model that led to the reduced-form 
equation (1) used in evaluations of area-yield insurance.  However, more than one 
structural model might be consistent with the reduced form model in (1).  In this section, 
we characterize the entire class of structural models that imply the reduced form model.  
We do this in two steps.  Proposition 4 below identifies the class of structural models 
implied by the reduced form relation (1).  Then in Proposition 5, we show that every 
member of this class implies (1).  It thus follows that no structural model outside the class 
identified in Proposition 4 can imply reduced form model (1).   
  Suppose a general structural model of the form  
      ) , , ( q i i i e f y z =  
where, as before, ei and q  are the random realizations of individual risk and aggregate 
shock and  f is a function that maps the individual risk, the aggregate shock and a vector   10
of parameters z into realized yields.  In the previous section, zi consisted of a single 
parameter m i, the i’th producer’s mean yield.  Suppressing zi, we can write the model as  
(12)          ) , ( q i i i e f y =  
where the function fi is now specific to producer i.  If the relationship between individual 
yield and area yield is linear as in (1), then what restrictions must the function fi satisfy?  
 
Proposition 4: If the relationship between individual and area yields is described by (1), 
the structural model (12) necessarily satisfies the following:  
(a) For all i, ) ( ) ( ) , ( q q i i i i i i g e h e f y + = =  where hi and gi are functions that map 
non-systemic shocks and systemic shocks respectively into individual yields.  
(b) For all i, there exists a function k(.) and a parameter li such that, 
i i i c k g + = ) ( ) ( q l q  where ci is a constant of integration that possibly varies with 
i.  
Proof:   The structural model (12) satisfies 
      ) / )( / ( ) / ( i i i i i i e y e y ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ e e  
But from the reduced form model (1),  1 / = ¶ ¶ i i y e . Hence  
      = ¶ ¶ ) / ( i i e y ) / ( i i e ¶ ¶e   
Notice, that the reduced form model splits the variation in individual yields into variation 
in area yield y and an individual-specific risk  i e .  By assumption, y and  i e  are 
orthogonal.  It follows that area yield y is a function of q  alone while  i e  is a function of 
ei alone.  Hence  
0 ) / ( ) / (
2 2 = ¶ ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ ¶ q e q i i i i e e y    11
i.e., the cross-partial derivatives of (12) are zero.  Since this can be true only if (12) is 
additive in the two risks, we have the result in part (a).   
We now turn to the proof of part (b) of Proposition 4.  Define the parameter di = 
q ¶ ¶ / i y .  di measures the sensitivity of producer i’s yield to aggregate shocks.  Also 
define d as the sensitivity of area yield to aggregate shocks, i.e.,  q d ¶ ¶ = / y . Since 







d d .  Now  
(13)      di =  ) / )( / ( / q q ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ y y y y i i  =  ) / ( y yi ¶ ¶ d .   
Hence, for all i, 
(14)         
d
di
i y y = ¶ ¶ /    
Fix a  producer j and define, for all i, li =  ) / /( ) / ( y y y y j i ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ .  Clearly lj is 1.   Using 
(14) we obtain,  j i i d l d = .  Using part(a) of Proposition 4, this can be written as  
(15)        ) / ( / q l q ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ j i i g g .   
li does not vary with the aggregate shock q .  This can be seen from the reduced form 
model (1), where for all i, y yi ¶ ¶ / is a parameter that is independent of the realization of 
q.   Integrating both sides of (14) with respect to q, we therefore find that, for all i, the 
structural model satisfies  i j i i c g g + = ) ( ) ( q l q  where ci is a constant of integration that 
varies with i.  Since j is arbitrarily chosen, we define k(q) to be  ) (q j g .  This proves part 
(b).     12
  Proposition 4 specifies the class of structural models implied by  equation (1).  
The next result shows that the relationship runs the other way too, i.e., every member of 
the class identified in Proposition 4 implies (1).   
 
Proposition 5:  The structural model in (12) has a reduced form representation as in (1) 
provided the structural model satisfies  
(16)    ) , ( i i i e f y q = =  ) ( ) ( i i i i e h k b a + + q  
 where  (.) i k  and  (.) i h  are monotone functions, ai and bi are parameters that possibly 
vary with i.   
Proof:  From (16), mean producer yield is  
(17)      )] ( [ )] ( [ i i i i i e h E k E b a + + = q m  
and area yield is  
) ( ) ( i i i i i i i e h w b w k a w y ￿ ￿ ￿ + + = q  
Denote  i ia w a ￿ = and  i ib w b ￿ = .  Using the weak law of large numbers, 
￿
i
i i i e h w ) ( can be approximated in large samples by  )] ( [ i i e h E .  Hence  
(18)       ) ( ) ( ) ( i i e Eh bk a y + + = q q  
Mean area yield is therefore  
(19)      ) ( ) ( i i e Eh bEk a + + = q m  
Adding and subtracting m i to the right-hand side of (16), we get  
)] ( ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [ i i i i i i i e Eh e h Ek k b y - + - + = q q m    13
where we have used (17).  But from (18) and (19),  )] ( ) ( [ q q m Ek k b y - = - .  Denoting 
i i b b b = ) / (  and  i i i i i e Eh e h e = - )) ( ) ( ( , we get  
      i i i i y y e m b m + - + = ) (  
where ei is a mean zero random variable uncorrelated with area yield.   
  From Propositions 4 and 5, we conclude that the class of structural models that 
satisfy (16) constitutes the entire class of structural models that has a reduced form 
representation (1).  Depending on the choice of functions g and hi, and the parameters ai 
and bi, there can be many special cases of (16).  However, as we have seen, in all models 
satisfying (16), the beta parameter will be related to the structural parameters in the 
following manner.  
 
Proposition 6:  In the general structural model that is equivalent to the reduced form 
model in (1), the parameters satisfy  
(a)  i i b b b = / .   
(b)  i i i i i e Eh e h e = - ) ( ) (  
  We may note couple of implications of Proposition 6.  bi measures the sensitivity 
of producer i’s yield to aggregate shocks while b is the sensitivity of area yield to 
aggregate shocks.  Part (a) of Proposition 6 therefore states that bi, the sensitivity of 
producer i’s yield to area yield is that producer’s sensitivity to aggregate shocks relative 
to the sensitivity of area yield to aggregate shocks.  Also recall that when area yield 
insurance is optimal, the producer bears only the risk  i e .  From part (b) of Proposition 6, 
it can be seen therefore that, with optimal area yield insurance, the variability of producer   14
profits is  )). ( ( i i e h Var  
 
Special Cases 
Given Proposition 6, it is easy to compute the betas for special cases.  We 
consider a few specifications that are popular in the literature.   
Case (a):   ) ( i i i e y a gq m + =  
This is the multiplicative specification considered earlier.  It is additive in the interaction 
of systemic and non-systemic shocks.  Fix any j and define  gq m q j k = ) ( .  Define bi = 
(m i/m j) and  i i i i e e h a m = ) ( .  Then, individual yields can be written as ) ( ) ( i i i i e h k b y + = q , 
which is a special case of the structural model (16).  Here, b =  j m m/ .  Applying 
Proposition 6, we can compute bi as  m m / i .    
Case (b):  q m + + = i i i e y  
  In this specification, risks are additive to mean yield.  It clearly satisfies (16).  
Here k(q) = q, bi = 1 and so b = 1.  Hence bi = 1 for all i.  Note this result obtains even 
though producers are heterogenous in mean yields.  What is important for there to be 
heterogeneity in betas is heterogeneity in the way the aggregate shock affects mean 
yields.   
Case (c):  ) ( i i i i e y + + = q s m  
This is the specification of a stochastic production function due to Just and Pope.  This is 
also a special case of (16) where k(q) = q, bi = si and therefore b = s where  ￿ =
i
i i ws s  
Therefore bi = si/s.     15
 
 
Systemic Risks, Non-Systemic Risks and Aggregation  
 
  A design issue is the selection of the area that should be used as the basis for 
computing area yields.  To maximize correlation of producer yield with area yield, it has 
been suggested that “the area or zone boundaries for an area yield contract should be 
selected so as to group together the largest possible number of farms with similar soils 
and climate” (Skees, Black and Barnett).  To evaluate this recommendation, we turn to a 
structural model with different levels of aggregation.   
Suppose producer yields can be averaged at two levels of aggregation.
3  For 
convenience, call the smaller aggregation as a cluster and the larger aggregation as a 
county.  Yield of producer i in cluster c of county k is given by   
(20)        ick ick ick y h m =  where  
k ck ick ick e 2 3 1 2 1 q a q a a h + + =  
where eick is a shock specific to i, q1ck  is a shock specific to all producers in cluster c of 
county k and q2k is a shock common to all producers in county k.  In other words, eick  is 
the individual risk, q1ck is the cluster-specific risk and q2k is the county-specific risk. The 
risks have unit means, constant variances and are stochastically independent.  Also 
assume ￿ =1 i a .   This ensures the mean of yick is m ick.  The individual risk eick is 
distributed independently of the individual mean yield m ick.   
                                                 
3 Extension to many levels is straightforward.    16
  Consider first area yield insurance schemes where the indemnity schedule is 
contingent on cluster yields.  The average yield of cluster c in county k can be calculated 
as  








ick w e w y w m q a q a m a ) ( 2 3 1 2 1  
where  ick w  is the share of the ith producer in the area of cluster c.  Denote cluster c’s 
yield as yck and its mean as m ck.  By arguments similar to that in preceding sections, 
substitute  ick ick
i
ick e w m ￿  by its large sample approximation m ck.  Hence  
(21)      ck k ck ck y m q a q a a ] [ 2 3 1 2 1 + + =  
Thus, cluster yields are random because of cluster-specific risk and county-specific risk.  
Area yield insurance schemes at the cluster level would therefore offer protection against 
both these risks.  Write   ) ( 2 3 1 2 k ck k q a q a q + = .  qk denotes the systemic risk at the cluster 
level.  Hence, for the cluster yield insurance scheme, we can write the equations of the 
structural model as  
(22)      ) ( 1 k ick ick ick ick ick e y q a m h m + = =  and 
(23)      ck k ck y m q a ) ( 1 + =  
Since (22) satisfies the structure of (16), the relationship between individual and cluster 
yields can be represented by a reduced form model like (1).  In particular, we can write  
      ick ck ck ick ick ick y y e m b m + - + = ) (       
where, by Proposition 6, the beta of an individual producer can be computed 
ck ick ick m m b / = .  By the same proposition, the disturbance term in the linear model 
is ). 1 ( 1 - = ick ick ick e m a e   Because optimal area insurance (on the basis of cluster yields)   17
eliminates systemic risk (at the cluster level), the variance of profits for a producer with 
insurance is  ) ( ) ( ) ( 2
1 i ick i e Var Var m a e = .  The reduction in variance due to cluster yield 
insurance is  ) ( ) ( ) ( 2
k i i ick Var Var Var q e h m = - .   
  Consider next area yield insurance schemes where the indemnity is contingent on 
county yield rather than cluster yield.   The average yield of county k can be calculated by 
using (21) to average across clusters within the county.  Hence   
ck
c






ck ck w w w y w m q a m q a m a ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + + = 2 3 1 2 1  
where wck is the share of cluster c in area of county k.  Denote yk  to be county yield and 
m k to be its mean.  Because  ck 1 q is a cluster specific risk, averaging across clusters should 
lead this risk be approximately equal to its expected value.  Using this approximation and 
arguments similar to that in equations (7) to (9),  k ck ck
c
ck w m m q = ￿ 1 .  Substituting,  
  k k k y m q a a a ) ( 2 3 2 1 + + =  
Denoting  2 1 a a +  as a, and  ck i e 1 2 1 q a a + as vick, the structural equations for the county 
yield insurance scheme are  
(24)       ) ( 2 3 k ick ick ick v y q a m + =  and 
(25)      k k k y m q a a ) ( 2 3 + =  
Compare (24) and (22).  At the county level, the systemic risk is q2k while it is qk at the 
cluster level.  The non-systemic individual specific risk changes too.  At the county level, 
what is measured as the non-systemic risk is  ck ick e 1 2 1 q a a +  while it is  ick e 1 a  at the 
cluster level.  Higher aggregation reduces systemic risk and increases non-systemic 
individual specific risk.  In the extreme, averages at the level of nation or group of   18
nations may be so stable that the systemic risk component of a producer’s yield might be 
close to zero.  In such a case, all producer risk would be non-systemic individual specific 
risk.   
(24) is additive in systemic and non-systemic risks and satisfies (16).  Thus (24)  
can also be represented by a reduced form linear relationship (1) such that  
ick k k ick ick ick y y e m b m + - + = ) (  
where, by Proposition 6, the beta is now  k ick ick m m b / =  and the disturbance term 
is ). ( a m e - = ick ick ick v   Since optimal area insurance (on the basis of county yields) 
eliminates systemic risk (at the county level), the variance of profits for a producer with 
optimal county yield insurance is  ) ( ) (
2
ick ick ick v Var Var m e =  = 




1 ck ick ick ick Var e Var q m a m a + .  Consequently, the reduction in variance due 




k i i i Var Var Var q a m e h = - .   
Compared with the reduction achieved by cluster yield insurance, we see that the 
cluster yield insurance achieves an additional variance reduction of  ) ( 1 2 ck ick Var q a m .  
This happens because, while q1ck is a systemic risk at the cluster level, it becomes a non-
systemic risk at the county level and is therefore not insured by the county yield 
insurance scheme.
4  The division of producer risk into systemic and non-systemic risks is 
therefore dependent on the level of aggregation.  Higher is the level of aggregation, 
greater are individual risks, smaller are systemic risks and hence smaller are the risk 
reduction impacts of area-yield insurance.   
                                                 
4 It is easy to show that cluster yields are more correlated with producer yields than county yields.     19
Skees, Black and Barnett are right in emphasizing that farms with similar soils 
and climate should be grouped together.  In terms of the structural model, such a 
grouping would face risks that do not cancel out in the aggregate and hence would 
qualify as systemic risks.  However, what our analysis has pointed out is that more risks  
are likely to survive aggregation (and hence be regarded as systemic) when the farmer 
groups are as small as possible.  Hence, for area yield insurance to have the maximum 
impact on risk reduction, the area boundaries for an area yield contract should be selected 
so as to group together the smallest (and not the largest) number of farms with similar 
soils and climate.
5     
 
The Multiplicative Case 
  Consider a structural model where, for a given level of aggregation, individual 
yields are described by  
(26)      i i i y h m =  and  q h i i e =  
where the variables continue to have the same meaning and properties as before.  The 
difference from (4) lies in the multiplicative interaction of risks.  Such a specification is 
natural whenever the yield impacts of one risk depend on the realization of the other risk 
as well.  For instance, even with a positive systemic shock due to say excellent rainfall, 
the impact on an individual producer’s yield might be negligible because of a local risk 
such a pest or fungal infestation.  Conversely, very adverse aggregate shocks could 
                                                 
5 Informational problems aside, the smallest possible group consists of only a single producer.  With the 
informational problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, the smallest group would be the minimum 
group size in which group outcomes are immune to the actions of any one individual.  The smallest group 
size is therefore greater than one.     20
nullify a good outcome in terms of local risks.  In an additive structure, on the other hand, 
the impact of rainfall is invariant to local risks and vice-versa.
6  
(26) does not satisfy (16) and thus does not possess a reduced form representation 
(1).  Earlier results of Miranda and Mahul are therefore not applicable to (26).  To see 
how the multiplicative structure makes a difference, refer to (4) as the additive model and 
(26) as the multiplicative model.  As noted earlier, in the additive model, the slope of the 
optimal indemnity schedule is  ) / ( m m b i i = - and is invariant to the non-systemic risk 
and its moments.  Since at this level of insurance, all systemic risk is eliminated, it is 
optimal to fully insure against systemic risks in the additive model.  To see whether these 
results extend to the multiplicative model, it is necessary to directly analyze the structural 
form (26) as the reduced form (1) is unavailable.   
The area yield associated with (26) is  ￿ =
i
i ie y m q .  By using large sample 
approximations, we can express area yield as  
(27)        mq = y  
Substituting in (26),  
(28)        i i i ye y ) / ( m m = =  i iye b  
where we have denoted  ) / ( m m i by b i .  Notice that, when the non-systemic risk is absent 
and is equal to its expected value 1, (28) is identical to the reduced form of the additive 
model (11).  From the results that apply to the additive model, we therefore have that the 
insurance schedule satisfies  i y I b - = ) ( '  whenever there is no non-systemic risk.  Now 
                                                 
6 For an analysis of multiplicative structures arising from the interaction of price and quantity risks, see 
Mahul (2000) and Ramaswami and Roe (1992).     21
suppose ei is a random variable that takes values other than one with nonzero probability.  
Using (2), we can write producer i’s revenue with insurance as  
P y I ye P y I y i i i i - + = - + = ) ( ) ( b p  
An actuarially fair optimal insurance contract maximizes expected utility of producer i 
subject to the break-even constraint of the insurers.  Hence it solves  
(29) Max
y I ) (
 ￿￿
i e y
i i e dF y dG U ) ( ) ( ) (p  subject to  ￿ =
y
y dG y I P ) ( ) (  
where U is an increasing, concave and thrice differentiable utility function, F is the 
cumulative density of the non-systemic shock, and G is the cumulative density of area 
yield derived from the probability distribution of the systemic shock q (from (27)).  Note 
that since area yield is a function of q  alone, it is distributed independently of the non-
systemic risk.   
Let l be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the break-even constraint.  Then 
the optimal function I(.) satisfies for every y 
(30)  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ' y f e dG y f U i i
ei
l p = ￿  
where  dy y dF y f / ) ( ) ( = .  Clearly (30) can also be written as  
    l p = ] | ) ( ' [ y U E i  
i.e., the optimal insurance equalizes the expected marginal utility in every state of area 
yield, y.  Differentiating the first order condition with respect to y,  
0 ))] ( ' )( ( ' [ = + y I e U E i i b p  
from which we can solve for the slope of the indemnity schedule as  
(31)    ]
) ( ' '
) ), ( ' ' (







i + - =    22
0 ' ' < EU and so the sign of 
) ( ' '




e U Cov i  is opposite to the sign of the covariance 
term.  Since  y U e U i i i i b p p ) ( ' ' ' ) / ) ( ' ' ( = ¶ ¶ , the covariance term is positive, equal to zero 
or negative as  ' ' ' U  is positive, zero or negative.  A risk-averse agent with a positive third 
derivative of utility function has been referred to as prudent (Kimball, ).  It is easy to 
show that an agent with non-increasing risk-aversion must be prudent.   ' ' ' U  is zero for an 
agent with a quadratic utility function.  Since constant or decreasing risk-aversion is a 
reasonable restriction on risk-averse behaviour, we concentrate below on the case when 
0 ' ' ' > U .   
 
Proposition 8:  If systemic and non-systemic risks interact multiplicatively, the optimal 
insurance for a prudent producer I satisfies  i y I b < - ) ( ' . 
  The proof is immediate from (31).  Recall, that when non-systemic risk is absent, 
i y I b = - ) ( ' .  This can also be seen directly from (31).  Thus, in the presence of an 
uninsured non-systemic risk, it is optimal for a producer to choose a lower level of 
coverage as compared to the case where non-systemic risk is absent.  This is unlike the 
additive case where the demand for insurance against the systemic risk is unaffected by 
non-systemic risk.   
To analyse local changes in risk, consider a one term expansion of  ' ' U  as  
  )) ( ( ' ' ' )) ( ( )) ( ( ' ' ) ( ' ' p p p p p E U E E U U - + =  or  
)) ( ( ' ' ' ) 1 ( )) ( ( ' ' ) ( ' ' p b p p E U e y E U U i i - + =  
Substituting in (31),    23
(32)    ]
)) ( ( ' '
)) ( ( ' ' '






e yVar y I i i i + - =  
Greater is the riskiness of the non-systemic risk, smaller is the optimal coverage for a 
prudent producer.  The demand for area yield insurance depends therefore on the 
uninsured non-systemic risks faced by an individual producer.   As seen earlier, the 
classification of risks as either systemic or non-systemic changes with the area size used 
for computing area yields.  In a multiplicative model, therefore, the demand for area yield 
insurance will depend on the level of aggregation at which area yields are determined.  
Since higher aggregations increase non-systemic risk, they would reduce the demand for 
area yield insurance.   
To see this, denote I1 and I2 as the optimal insurance contracts at the cluster and 
county levels of aggregation.  Suppose also that the mean yields of all producers are 
equal.  Then bi = 1, irrespective of the level of aggregation.  In an additive model, the 
optimal coverage would satisfy  1 ) ( ' ) ( ' 2 1 = - = - k ck y I y I  where yck and yk are cluster and 
county yields.    
In a multiplicative model, individual yields, cluster yields and county yields are 
given by  k ck ick ick ick e y 2 1 q q m = ,  k ck ck ck y 2 1 q q m = and  k k k y 2 q m = .  Hence the non-
systemic risk for cluster insurance is  ck ick e 1 q but is only  ick e  for a county yield insurance.  
The variance of non-systemic risk is therefore greater with county yield insurance.  From 
Proposition 8 and (32), it follows that the optimal coverage for a prudent producer 
satisfies  ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 2 1 k ck y I y I > - > .   
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Conclusions 
  From previous literature, we know that the extent of risk-reduction achievable by 
an area yield insurance plan is proportional to bi which is the slope coefficient in a linear 
regression of individual yields on area yields.  In this paper, such a relationship is derived 
on the basis of a structural model that described the interaction of individual non-
systemic risks and aggregate systemic risks in determining individual yields.  As a result, 
this paper was able to throw light on the structural determinants of the betas.  The major 
insight is that the betas are determined by the sensitivity of individual yields to aggregate 
shocks relative to the sensitivity of area yields to aggregate shocks.  In the special case 
when aggregate shocks affect all producers identically even when they are otherwise 
heterogenous, all producers have betas identically equal to 1.  Comparison of betas across 
regions is therefore not meaningful.   
The implications for policy are the following.  Firstly, if the coverage in an area 
yield insurance plan is restricted, then it hurts producers who are the most vulnerable to 
aggregate shocks since they are the ones likely to have betas greater than the permissible 
coverage.  Secondly, since the betas are not comparable across areas, a coverage 
restriction that is uniform across areas hurts those high risk producers who are 
unfortunate to find themselves grouped with other low risk producers.  On the other hand, 
if all producers are prone to high risks, then their betas will be clustered around 1 and 
restriction of coverage levels to 100% of loss will not affect them.   
  If insurance coverage can be freely chosen, area insurance will eliminate systemic 
risks for all producers provided such risks interact additively.  In this case, the risk 
reduction impacts of area insurance depend on the size of systemic risks which, in turn,   25
depends on the level of aggregation.  In general, smaller aggregations are preferable to 
larger areas, as more risks are likely to survive aggregation at lower levels.  This 
consideration gains strength if risks interact multiplicatively.  In such a set-up, area 
insurance does not eliminate all systemic risk.  Moreover, the demand for insurance is not 
independent of the non-systemic risk.  Greater is the non-systemic risk, lower is the 
demand for insurance.  The feasibility of small area aggregations also depends on the size 
of farms.  Smaller are farm sizes (as in developing countries), more feasible will be 
smaller area aggregations and hence greater will be the risk reduction impacts of area 
yield crop insurance.   
  Firms whose profits depend on area yield such as insurance companies seeking re-
insurance or processors and firms that transact with large number of farms in a given area 
will benefit the most from area yield insurance.  Since their operations encompass large 
number of farms, they are largely exempt from the non-systemic risks.  Irrespective of 
whether the interaction of risks is additive or multiplicative, such firms will be able to use 
area yield insurance to fully eliminate systemic risks.   
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